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Abstract
Following the economic and political reforms of the 1990s, the Peruvian economy
experienced two decades of exceptional growth in the 2000s. How was inequality
affected by the strong growth performance of 2004-19? Which were the main
factors associated with these inequality changes? The distribution of both income
and consumption in Peru was highly unequal in 2004, with important geographic
and regional differences. Since then, the degree of economic disparity decreased
significantly associated with the exceptional growth of 2004–19. This decline in
inequality was broad-based, yet it was not homogeneous across geographic areas,
regions, or time. A correlate of this reduction in inequality has been a falling
polarization. While wages and, to a lesser extent, government transfers accounted
for most of the decline in income inequality, food prepared at home played a pivotal
role in reducing consumption inequality, particularly in rural areas.
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1 Introduction
The Peruvian economy has been one of the best performing emerging market economies over
the last two decades. This strong performance resulted from the economic structural changes
and peace process of the 1990s and the generally sound macroeconomic policies of the 2000s
(Rossini and Santos, 2015). Output growth in 2000-19 exceeded two and a half times the
average growth rates in the 1980s and 1990s while the inflation rate was in the low single
digits. Simultaneously, the share of the population living on less than US$ 4 a day has dropped
from more than 45 percent in 2000 to less than 25 percent (Cord et al., 2015), and the middle
class expanded significantly (Stampini et al., 2016). As the periods of economic malaise and
instability are long gone, the debate on how the benefits of economic growth are distributed
has intensified (see, inter alia, Genoni and Salazar, 2015; Székely and Mendoza, 2016; Morley,
2017).
In this paper, we show that inequality and economic growth in Peru have been inversely related
during the first two decades of the 21st Century.1 The nature of this relationship is broad-
based, as most Peruvians enjoyed the benefits from strong growth. We address the following
interrelated questions. How did inequality evolve in Peru during the strong growth period
from 2004 to 2019 (with an average real GDP growth rate of 5.2 percent)? Were the changes
in inequality homogeneous across geographical areas, regions, and time? What were the main
factors behind these changes?
There are two strands of literature that study the interaction between inequality and growth.
First, there is substantial literature examining the association between inequality and long-
run growth. In principle, the relationship between these two variables could either be positive
or negative. Higher inequality resulting from granting economic incentives that promote
innovation and human capital accumulation could be associated with faster long-run growth
(see Romer, 1986; Benabou, 1996). Alternatively, higher inequality resulting from rent-seeking
activities could be associated with reduced human capital accumulation and slower long-run
growth (see Terrones, 1990; Benabou, 1996; Esteban and Ray, 2011). Inequality also reduces
growth in economies with skill-biased technological change by decreasing investment in skills
(Murphy and Topel, 2016). What does the data say about the association between inequality
and long-run growth? The evidence in panel-country studies suggests that higher inequality
is detrimental to long-run growth (see Berg et al., 2018).
Second, the literature that examines the association between inequality and growth in the
short–run is relatively sparse and with mixed results. Some economists study how inequality
moves with the business cycle. For instance, Dimelis and Livada (1999) find that inequality
can be countercyclical –it falls during expansions and increases during contractions– in some
major advanced economies such as the UK and the US, or can be procyclical –increases
during expansions and falls during contractions –in other economies such as Italy and Greece.
Similarly, Hacibedel et al. (2019) report cross–country evidence that inequality typically
decreases during growth upswings but increases during growth slowdowns. Finally, Goderis
and Malone (2011) examine how inequality is affected by commodity booms and find evidence
that inequality temporarily declines immediately after a mineral or oil boom. In contrast,
Loayza and Rigolini (2016) find that consumption inequality is higher in the districts that are
1 The term inequality in economics usually refers to the uneven distribution of income, consumption, or wealth
among the population of a country. These distributions generally reflect market outcomes, which are often
altered by government redistributive policies.
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more affected by the boom.
This paper is related to this second strand of the literature, and makes three contributions to
the burgeoning empirical literature on inequality in emerging markets and, in particular, Peru.
First, it examines the main characteristics of income inequality and consumption inequality
within a comprehensive and unified framework, using several inequality indicators that help
assess the robustness of the main findings.2 Second, it documents the changes in the degree
of inequalities across geographic areas, regions, and over time, while exploring whether or not
the inequality changes are related to economic growth.3 Third, it analyzes the most important
factors that are associated with the changes in income and consumption inequality.
There are several other studies that examine inequality in Peru, but with different approaches
and emphasis than ours. For instance,Yamada et al. (2012) examine the role of public policies
to reduce income inequality from 2004 to 2014. Paz and Urrutia (2015) and Robles and
Robles (2016) document that increases in labor earnings explain poverty reduction, whereas a
reduction in the returns to education helps explain the decrease in income inequality. Herrera
(2017) and Winkelried and Torres (2019) studied poverty, social mobility, and inequality in
Peru since the turn of the millennium, but examine inequality only in a cursory way. Lastly,
Morley (2017) and Flachsbarth et al. (2018) provide a careful account of incomes and earnings
in rural Peru.
We first show that economic disparities in Peru were high and pervasive in 2004, but decreased
significantly by 2019. For instance, in terms of percentiles, the bottom half of the population
accounted initially to one third of the income share of the top 10 percent; for consumption
the ratio was 2
5
. By the end of the sample period, the bottom half of the income distribution
amounted to 2
5
(> 1
3
) of the share of the top 10 percent, and the bottom half of the consumption
distribution spent some 1
2
(> 2
5
) of the share of the top 10 percent. Similar conclusions are
reached using the well-known Gini and Theil indices as these indicators showed a downward
trend. Despite the significant reduction in economic disparities in the first two decades of the
21st Century, Peru remains among the top 1
3
of unequal countries in the world.
Even though the reduction of inequality in Peru has been broad-based, the pace of disparity
reduction across geographic areas and political regions varied significantly. As a result, the
heterogeneous spatial pattern of inequality in the country changed further between 2004 and
2019. Inequality declined significantly more in the urban areas than in rural ones, particularly
with regards to income. Moreover, disparities fell by much less in the Amazon than in the
other geographical regions and this region became the most unequal one by 2019. Finally,
inequality decreased in most but not all of the political regions (Departamentos), affecting
their inequality rankings.
We provide evidence that the gains in disparity reduction were associated with strong economic
growth. First, income and consumption growth have been inclusive, as their growth rates
have been systematically higher for the bottom of their distributions than for the top. The
declining inequality also correlates with falling polarization, which is attributed to a significant
expansion of the middle class. Second, panel regression analysis for the political regions shows
2 Income and consumption are the most studied variables in the inequality literature, albeit not always in a
unified way (see Krueger and Perri, 2006). In general, income inequality and consumption inequality do not
track each other. Wealth inequality, the third aspect of a country’s overall inequality, also adjusts. In this
study, we do not examine wealth inequality because of data limitations.
3 Annual growth in Peru was positive in all the years of 2000-19. In a related study, the World Bank (2014)
examines how inequality in Latin America could respond to an economic growth deceleration.
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that there is a negative association between inequality indicators and regional growth, with
income responding to grow faster than consumption.
Finally, we examine several factors that are associated with the two-decade decline in
inequality. On the one hand, rising wages and, to a lesser extent, public transfers are the
key factors contributing to the reduction of income inequality, particularly in urban areas. On
the other hand, increasing food prepared at home and services helped reduce consumption
inequality. Interestingly, food is an essential equalizing force in rural areas, while services play
a mixed role, equalizing in the urban areas and unequalizing in the rural ones.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data. In
Section 3, we document some stylized facts about inequality in Peru, across geographic areas,
regions, and time, and report several results on the link between growth and inequality from
2004 to 2019. In Section 4, we briefly review the Shorrocks (1982) and Lerman and Yitzhaki
(1985) methods to decompose inequality indices into the contribution of constituents. Then,
we identify the main sources associated with income and consumption inequality. Finally, in
Section 5, we conclude.
2 The data
In this section, we discuss the dataset’s main features, including whether one should pretreat
the original data.
2.1 The database
The data come from the National Household Survey on Living Conditions (ENAHO). This
survey is the official source to measure national poverty in Peru, and includes detailed
information on income and consumption expenditure. The focus population is the set of rural
and urban private dwellings of the country and their occupants. The survey has been collected
and processed by the Peruvian National Institute of Statistics (INEI) since the mid-1990s, but
a major methodological revision took place in 2004. Thus, the sample period in our analysis,
2004 to 2019, comprises the most extensive set of annual surveys that allow an intertemporal
analysis of inequality in the first two decades of this century. The number of households
interviewed grew from 19,502 in 2004 to 34,565 in 2019. All monetary variables are deflated
using 2019 Lima (the capital city) prices. When required, we obtain complementary data from
the Central Bank of Peru and the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
The real per capita income and the real per capita consumption are the two main variables
of interest. These are obtained by dividing real total gross household income or real total
household expenditure by the number of household members. Total income is equal to the sum
of wages, public transfers, and other income. Wages include both employed, and self–employed
labor income; public transfers comprise current transfers and a variety of public grants; and
other income includes private transfers and income from other sources. Total consumption
expenditure is the sum of food, services, apparel and personal care, and other consumption
expenses. Food expenses only include home-prepared meals; services comprise expenses in
health, education, transport, housing, and electricity; apparel and personal care consist of
expenses on clothing, including for kids, and personal care; and other expenses include, among
others, entertainment, consumption in restaurants, and durable goods expenses.
We also utilize variables that help split the sample into geographic areas, geographic regions,
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and political regions. Regarding the geographic areas, the population is grouped by their
residence area, i.e., whether households live in rural areas (countryside) or urban areas (towns
or cities). In ENAHO, the urban areas include cities or towns with at least 100 clustered
dwellings or district capitals. In contrast, the rural areas comprise towns with least than
100 dwellings or over 100 non–contiguous dwellings. Over time there has been net migration
from the rural area to the urban one, reflecting less access to services (including health and
education) and work opportunities in the former. Between 2007 and 2017 (the two census years
in our sample), the urban population grew by 1.6 percent per year, and the rural population
fell by 2.1 percent per year. Moreover, many of the Peruvian poor and extremely poor live in
rural areas (see World Bank, 2017; INEI, 2019).
The geographic region variables refer to how geographic considerations split the Peruvian
territory. There are four geographic regions: North, Center, South, and Amazon. Except for
the Amazon, each region holds territories in both the Pacific coast and highlands. The main
cities, including Lima, and the main production centers, are located in the North and Center
regions. The South region includes the most important mining areas and tourist centers.
Finally, the Amazon is the region with the lowest population density and economic activity.
In addition, the Peruvian territory is organized into 26 administrative regions since 2002.
These regions overlap with the traditional 24 Departmentos, with the Departmento of Lima,
in turn, divided into three subregions (Metropolitan, Callao, and provinces). In this study, we
consider Lima as a single region, yielding a total of 24 regions. Some of the administrative
regions have territories in more than one of the three geographical zones–coast, highlands, and
jungle–comprising Peru.
We also split the sample into three sub-periods: 2004 to 2008, 2008 to 2013, and 2013 to 2019.
Figure 1 summarizes critical macroeconomic information about these sub-periods. The first
sub-period is characterized by strong economic growth fueled by favorable terms of trade,
which allowed the creation of government transfers (conditional cash transfers and housing
subsidies). The second sub-period is marked by the Great Recession and slow recovery in the
advanced economies, which translates into weak terms of trade and a growth slowdown in
the Peruvian economy. Despite these weaker economic conditions, public transfers expanded
significantly. The third sub-period is characterized by an even weaker economic growth, a
further deterioration in terms of trade, and a deceleration of the government transfers. This
last sub-period also featured increased political turmoil due to the confrontation between the
executive branch and Congress starting in mid–2016.
2.2 To pretreat or not pretreat the survey data
There is a debate about how to pretreat the data from household surveys. It is well documented
that household surveys and national accounts produce different per capita means, with the
former being typically smaller than the latter (Deaton, 2005). These differences are the results
of many factors, including different coverages, prices, periods, among others. Also, several
studies have noted that household surveys suffer from income sub–reporting and self–exclusion
of the top income households. Researchers have used a couple of methods to adjust the
lower survey means with the national account means in the Peruvian case. Some allocate
the difference to all income deciles assuming a log-normal distribution (see Mendoza et al.,
2011; Yamada et al., 2012), while others assign the brunt of the difference to the highest
income decile (Cruz Saco et al., 2018). The corrected Gini indices are higher than the original
ones, but, with the exception of the latest, still show a downward trend in the 2000s and 2010s.
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However, national accounts are often measured with even larger errors than household surveys
(Deaton, 2005), and these amended indicators are not necessarily better than the original ones
(see also Bourguignon, 2015). In Peru, the large size of the cash and underground economy
complicates the national accounts usefulness as pre-treatment source even further.
In other studies, researchers combine household survey data with other administrative sources
to address the tail problem noted above. For instance, the World Bank (2014) in an attempt
to assess whether the reduction in inequality in Latin America in the 2000s was the result of
the top tail reporting problems, complemented household survey data with tax administration
information for a small number of countries in the region for which data was available. The
study reports for these countries, there is virtually no correlation between the two inequality
measures obtained from household surveys or tax data. This, together with both sources
providing incomplete information about inequality, makes the conclusions dependent on the
source one utilizes. When mixing survey with administrative sources, they find that while
the Gini coefficients increase in magnitude, their trend is similar to that of the original Gini.
There are, however, important questions about the usefulness of tax administration data as a
complement for household surveys as there is no correspondence between these two sources,
which has a bearing on the sampling framework for the upper tail.
This paper utilizes the household survey data without correcting for the top tail problem.
Other researchers have also followed this route, both for cross-country inequality and poverty
studies (see Ferreira et al., 2013; Cord et al., 2015; Stampini et al., 2016) and for examining
the Peruvian living conditions (see Paz and Urrutia, 2015; Herrera, 2017; Morley, 2017; World
Bank, 2017; Flachsbarth et al., 2018; INEI, 2019). The survey data, however, presents other
challenges, such as the presence of dirty or imperfect data. Several factors explain this problem,
including data coding or transcription errors and lack of reliable self–employment income data,
among others (Cowell and Litchfield, 1999). There are two methods utilized in the literature to
address this problem: trimming and winsorizing. The former method trims from the dataset a
selected percentage (say 1 percent) of the top and bottom data tail, so the main features of the
distribution of the trimmed variables change, but the median remains unchanged. The latter
method is related to the former, but the extreme values are replaced by the top (bottom) 1 %
threshold values. Most of the winsorized variables’ distribution features, except for the tails,
remain the same as those of the original data, including their median value. Notably, the Gini
and Theil indicators from trimmed data are generally smaller than those from winsorized data.
We utilize this latter method in order not to change the values of the inequality indicators by
much. We perform this task by year and population sub-groups. It is important to note that
this study’s main qualitative findings do not significantly change when we utilize the original
survey data (see Appendix).
3 Inequality, growth, and polarization
We now document some facts about inequality in Peru and study the link between inequality
and economic growth in the first two decades of this Century. Towards this objective,
we construct several inequality indicators, including the Gini coefficient and Theil index.
These indicators are Lorenz consistent and, therefore, are useful to make robust inequality
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comparisons over time and across regions.4 We also examine the ratio of the income (expense)
share of the bottom-earner (spender) 20% to that of the top 20%. Finally, we study the
evolution of polarization over these two decades.
3.1 Inequality was relatively high in 2004 and has fallen since then
In 2004 inequality in Peru was slightly below the average of Latin America, one of the world’s
most unequal regions,5 but was much higher than the OECD average (Gasparini et al., 2011).
The 2004 Gini and Theil indices for income were 46.9 and 38.8, respectively; for consumption,
they were 38.2 and 25.1. Lastly, the bottom-earner half received one third of the share of the
top 10 percent, and the bottom-spender half expended slightly more than 2
5
the share of the
top 10 percent. Behind these figures were the relatively high and widespread poverty levels
existing in this country (Herrera, 2017). Peru’s per capita GDP was US$2,417 in 2004.
Regardless of the indicator, income and consumption inequality have experienced a significant
reduction from 2004 to 2019. Figure 2 shows the evolution of inequality indicators during this
period. The Gini and Theil indices show a downward trend, yet the reduction in inequality
has not been homogenous. The Gini coefficient for income and consumption fell in 14 and
12 percent, respectively. Likewise, the Theil indices for income and consumption fell by 29
and 25 percent, respectively. Lastly, the income and consumption shares of the bottom 20%
relative to those of the top 20% show an upward trend, highlighting the critical gains from the
relatively poor. These ratios rose in 2004–19 by 28 and 15 percent, respectively. The reduction
in income inequality is broadly consistent with that documented by Yamada et al. (2012),
Herrera (2017); and INEI (2019) for shorter sample periods. As noted by World Bank (2017),
poverty and extreme poverty were reduced sharply in most of this period. Peru’s per capita
GDP is estimated at US$7,020 in 2019.
The inequality indicators are highly persistent, which indicates that reducing these
disparities is a challenge for policymakers. The first-order autocorrelation coefficients for
the income inequality and consumption inequality indicators exceed 0.8, whereas the partial
autocorrelation functions of these indicators decay to zero gradually.6 Moreover, the income
and consumption-based inequality indicators are highly correlated, their contemporaneous
correlation coefficients being near 1. This suggests that a reduction in Peru’s income disparities
passed through consumption disparities, possibly reflecting that households cannot fully insure
against income shocks, as they do not have full access to insurance and credit markets.
The fall in inequality, however, has not been evenly paced. Table 1, top panel, reports the
inequality changes over the whole period and three sub-periods of analysis. The most significant
reduction in inequality, which represents between 45 and 53 percent of the total drop, took
place between 2008 and 2013. Paradoxically this period coincided with the Great Recession
and its aftermath. In contrast, the smallest inequality reduction, amounting to between 15 to
4 These indicators range from 0 to 1, however, in the presentation we multiply them by 100. To be Lorenz
consistent, and indicator must satisfy the following four principles (Foster and Lustig, 2019): symmetry,
population invariance, scale invariance, and transfer. If there are two Lorenz curves and one of them lies to
the right and below the other one, then the Gini (Theil) indicator of the rightmost curve should be higher.
5 According to the World Bank’s LAC equity lab (www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/lac-equity-lab1),
the average income Gini coefficient was 54.1 for Latin America and 49.9 for Peru in 2004. These are statistics
for non-winsorized data.
6 We do not perform unit root tests for these inequality indicators because of the limited time span of our
sample. Ghoshray et al. (2020) examine inequality persistence for a large sample of countries, including Peru,
from 1984 to 2015.
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19 percent of the total decline, took place either in the first or third sub-period, depending
on the variable of interest. The bottom 20% consumption share ratio to the top 20% fell in
2004–2008, and then rose in the other two sub-periods, particularly so from 2008 to 2013.
Notably, the position of the 2004 and 2019 Lorenz curves confirms the robustness of these
findings. In the top panel of Figure 3, we report the income and consumption Lorenz curves
for 2004 and 2019, including their 95% confidence bands. The 2019 Lorenz curves lie above
and to the left of the 2004 ones, indicating that the 2019 distribution Lorenz dominates the
2004 distribution.7 Thus, the 2019 distribution is more egalitarian than its corresponding
2004 distribution. The generalized Lorenz curves reported in the bottom panel of Figure 3
show the income (consumption) equality gains that Peruvians have achieved over time. These
curves combine information on the average income (consumption) levels (given by the height
of the curve) and the degree of income (consumption) inequality (given by the convexity of
the curve). The farther north the generalized Lorenz curve is from the horizontal axis, the
higher the welfare of individuals. Thus welfare increased monotonically from 2004 to 2019.
Regarding the centile information, we find that both income and consumption experienced
positive growth across deciles. However, growth was not homogenous as the relatively poor
benefited more than the relatively rich. Both income growth and consumption growth rates for
the bottom deciles are much higher than those for the middle and top deciles, particularly in
the case of income (Figure 4). Consistently with findings in Genoni and Salazar (2015), there is
no doubt that these critical growth gains enjoyed by the bottom percentiles were instrumental
in bringing down inequality. However, the reduction in inequality across percentiles has not
been homogeneous over time. From 2004 to 2008, when real GDP growth was robust, both
income and consumption growth of the bottom and top deciles fell behind the growth observed
in other deciles, particularly those in the middle of the distribution; in contrast, from 2008
to 2013 and 2013 to 2019, when real GDP growth slowed, the bottom deciles experienced
substantial growth gains vis–à–vis the rest of the deciles, particularly the top ones.
3.2 Inequality has decreased in urban and rural areas
In 2004, the degree of economic disparities was higher in urban areas than in rural ones. The
income (consumption) based Gini coefficient at 42.6 (34.4) was some 5 (10) percent higher
in the urban areas than in the rural ones. Moreover, the lower-earner (spender) half income
(consumption) share ratio relative to that of the top 10 percent was 6 (7) percent lower in the
urban area than in the rural ones. Real per capita income or consumption in the urban areas
were more than twice that in the rural ones.
The middle and bottom panels of Table 1 report the changes in inequality in both urban and
rural areas. There are three critical takeaways from this table. First, income inequality in the
urban areas fell substantially more than in rural ones. As a result, urban areas that started
with higher income inequality in 2004 finished in a tie with rural areas (Figure 5, leftmost
panels). Second, consumption inequality fell in rural areas by slightly more than in urban
ones. As a result, urban consumption disparities widened more than those in the rural ones
(Figure 5, rightmost panels). Third, the pace of inequality reduction in the urban and rural
areas varied across time. In the urban areas, inequality fell in the three sub-periods, with most
of the income (consumption) inequality reduction taking place in 2008/2013 (2004/2008). In
the rural areas, inequality first rose in 2004/2008 before falling in 2008/2019, with most of the
7 To avoid cluttering the charts, we have not included the Lorenz curves for the 2008 and 2013 distributions.
When placed all the curves together, one finds a sequential dominance by the most recent years.
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inequality reduction concentrated between 2013 and 2019.
The reduction in inequality in the urban and rural areas is validated by the evolution of income
and consumption growth by percentiles. Figure 6 shows that both income and consumption
growth in these two areas is higher for the bottom percentiles than for the top ones during
2004/2019. When examining the growth curves by sub-periods, we find the following. In
the urban areas, the income growth curves showed a downward trend in all sub-periods,
particularly during 2008/2013. In contrast, the consumption growth curves showed a downward
trend only in 2008/2013 and were mostly flat in the other sub-periods. In rural areas, all growth
curves showed an upward trend in 2004/2008, suggesting that growth was not inclusive in this
sub-period. However, this pattern reversed in the following two sub-periods as growth for the
lower percentiles is higher than those experienced by the top ones, particularly in 2013/2019.
3.3 Inequality has fallen in all geographic regions, but not in all political
regions
The levels of inequality varied significantly across geographic and political regions in 2004.
Disparities were more severe in the South, Center and North than in the Amazon (Figure
7). The inequality levels in the most unequal geographic region exceeded those of the least
unequal ones by over 5 percent (Gini) and 12 percent (Theil). There were also important
disparities across the political regions. The five least unequal regions based on income are
Madre de Dios, Tumbes, Lambayeque, Ancash, and Tacna. In contrast, the five most unequal
regions are Huánuco, Huancavelica, Amazonas, Loreto, and Ucayali. These rankings slightly
change when considering consumption. Ica and Moquegua replace Lambayeque and Ancash in
the former list, while La Libertad and Cuzco replace Huancavelica and Amazonas in the latter.
The Gini (Theil) coefficient for the most unequal political region exceeded the corresponding
coefficient for the least unequal one by over 40 (130) percent.
Between 2004 and 2019, inequality fell at different rates across the four geographic regions and
the 24 political regions. The North and Center regions experienced the most significant drop in
inequality, particularly in income inequality. In contrast, income and consumption inequality
barely fell in the Amazon region. As a result of these changes, this latter region was the
most unequal one in 2019, followed by the South (North) when using income (consumption)
inequality indicators. Likewise, inequality fell in most political regions (remarkably Ica,
Ucayali, Huancavelica, Arequipa, Lambayeque, and Pasco) but increased or did not change in
a few of them (namely Loreto, Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Madre de Dios, and Juńın).
The timing of the reduction of inequalities in the geographic regions also differs across sub-
periods (Table 2).8 The Center region reduced inequality from 2004 to 2008 and from 2008 to
2013. However, more than half of the inequality reduction in this region took place from 2008
to 2013. After experiencing an increase in inequality from 2004 to 2008, both the Amazon
and South regions trimmed inequality during the 2008 to 2013 and 2013 to 2019 sub-periods.
Lastly, the lion’s share of inequality reduction in the North region took place from 2013 to
2019. The evolution of the yearly distribution of the various inequality indicators for the
Peruvian political regions is shown in the boxplots of Figure 8. Clearly, the median values of
the inequality indicators for the political regions increased from 2004 to 2007/2008 and then
fell from 2008/2009 to 2019, particularly from 2008/2009 to 2014. Moreover, the inequality
8 For brevity, the changes in the Theil index are not reported but are available upon request. Similarly to Table
1, the qualitative conclusions obtained with the Theil index are almost identical to those reached by the Gini
index.
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indicators’ variability has changed over time, they initially widened in 2004/2008 and narrowed
subsequently.
The lists of the most unequal and most equal political regions in 2019 differ from those
of 2004. The five most unequal regions in terms of income are now Loreto, Cajamarca, San
Martin, Ayacucho, and Huánuco. In comparison, the five least unequal regions are Ica, Tumbes,
Lambayeque, Ucayali, and Arequipa. When considering consumption, La Libertad replaces
Ayacucho on the former list, and Pasco and Huancavelica replace Lambayeque and Arequipa
on the latter list. The case of Ucayali stands out because it ranked among the five most
unequal political regions in 2004, experienced a substantial inequality reduction from 2004 to
2019, and became one of the most egalitarian regions in 2019. This experience contrasts with
those of other political regions in the highlands and the jungle, where no critical inequality
reduction is observed.
The income growth and consumption growth curves show a downward trend in all geographic
regions, except the Amazon, during 2004/2019 (Figure 9). The growth curves, however, show
important differences over time. Growth in 2004/2008 was high in all regions; however, it
went from pro-poor in the Center (negative slope) to pro-rich in the South and Amazon
(positive slope). Growth slowed down in 2008/2013 and was consistently pro-poor in all regions,
particularly in the South. Finally, growth in 2013/2019 significantly slowed down in all regions
but remained pro-poor in the North and Amazon regions.
3.4 Is the decline in inequality associated with economic growth?
The stylized facts documented beg the following important question. Can the reduction in
inequality in Peru be associated with economic growth? We provide next a broad-brush
examination of the association between inequality and growth during 2004/2019.
We build a yearly panel regression model of inequality and real GDP growth for the 24 political
regions during the 2004/2019 period. With this model, we investigate whether there is a linear
association between the different measures of inequality and regional growth. In particular,
we postulate the following linear dynamic equation between these two variables.
Ii,t = ρIi,t−1 +
k∑
j=0
βjGrowthi,t−j + τt + αi + εi,t , (1)
where Ii,t is the level of each of the inequality indicators for political region i and period t,
Growthi,t−j is the real GDP growth rate for political region i in period t–j, τt is a time effect,
αi is the political region fixed effect, and εi,t is the error term. This error term is assumed to
present standard properties.
There are two quantities that are functions of the regression coefficients βj (j = 0, 1, . . . , k)
and ρ that summarize the dynamic relation between Growthi,t and Iit:
LRM =
β0 + β1 + · · ·+ βk
1− ρ
and ML =
β1 + 2β2 + · · ·+ kβk
β0 + β1 + · · ·+ βk
+
ρ
1− ρ
. (2)
LRM is the long-run multiplier and measures the effect on income (consumption) inequality
of a sustained change in regional GDP growth. Second, ML is the mean lag that measures the
average delay in the transmission of growth shocks to inequality.
Table 3 presents the estimations of equation (1) and for the quantities in (2) for various
structures. In particular, we consider a distributed lag model that sets ρ = 0 and k = 3, and
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an autoregressive distributed lag model also with k = 3 and ρ estimated freely. Unreported
results with other values for k render similar estimates for LRM.
The estimates of LRM and ML are not only statistically significant but are also robust to
the dynamic specification and the inequality indicator of analysis. The LRM is about −0.07
for the case of the Gini index and closer to −0.10 for the Theil index. The ML is smaller for
income inequality, with estimates between 1.50 and 1.75 years, and larger for consumption
inequality, with estimates between 2.00 and 2.75 years.
In summary, this regression analysis suggests that a sustained increase in economic growth is
associated with a significant decrease in the regional inequality indices, with income disparities
narrowing faster than consumption ones.
3.5 Polarization has fallen while the middle-class expanded
It has been recognized that having a large middle-class is essential for both political stability
and development. For instance, some argue that highly fragmented economies tend to be
more prone to social conflicts (Esteban and Ray, 2011). Moreover, economies with large
middle-classes generally enjoy higher per–capita income and welfare (Easterly, 2001). Has
the middle-class in Peru expanded or contracted during 2004/2019?
To address this issue, we utilize the polarization index advanced in Foster and Wolfson (2010).
This index, which belongs to bipolarization measures, utilizes the median to separate the
population into two groups. Notably, this index does not depend on a specific range. The
polarization index rises when the deviations from the median increase either through a higher
spread or larger extremes. More importantly, the middle–class size is inversely related to
the magnitude of the polarization index: when the polarization index rises, the middle–class
hollows out.9
Polarization in Peru was high at the beginning of this Century. The 2004 income and
consumption polarization indices were 44.7 and 33.3, respectively. Peru’s polarization was
slightly higher than the average polarization in Latin America in the early 2000s (see Gasparini
et al., 2008). Polarization in this region is higher than that of the OECD countries. Peru’s
middle-class was slightly smaller than that of the average country in the region.
Since then, polarization in Peru has fallen. Figure 10 portrays the income and consumption
polarization indices for 2004/2019. Two key messages stand out from this figure. First,
the polarization indicators in 2019 are significantly smaller than those in 2004: the income
and consumption indices fell by 17.8 and 11.5 percent during this period. Figure 11 shows
the income and consumption polarization curves, which are the median normalized income
(consumption) distance of a person at each percentile (Foster and Wolfson, 2010). The income
(consumption) polarization curve in 2004 is above or coincides with the one in 2019, which
implies that the latter curve dominates the former. All in all, the results indicate the Peruvian
middle class in 2019 is significantly larger than that in 2004. These findings are broadly
consistent with those reported by Herrera (2017) and Winkelried and Torres (2019).
Second, both income polarization and consumption polarization indices do not show a definite
trend despite this drop. After reaching a peak in 2006/2007, the polarization indices fell
significantly until 2016/2017 and rebounded somewhat (see Figure 10). As a result, the
9 Other polarization indices, including the Esteban and Ray (2011) polarization measure, separate the
population into an arbitrary number of groups.
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changes in polarization over the different sub-periods of analysis have not been homogeneous.
Table 4 reports the change in the Foster and Wolfson polarization measures for income and
consumption over each of the three sub-periods of analysis. The polarization indicators fell
slightly in 2004/2008; however, this change was not statistically significant. Most of the
reduction in the polarization indicators took place in the second sub-period, just like the
significant reduction in inequality reported earlier. Finally, despite some backtracking of these
gains, the polarization indices fell further in 2013/2019, particularly so in the case of income.
Inequality and polarization are two different, but related concepts. The polarization index is a
function of the difference of “between-group” inequality and “within-group” inequality, which
is measured in the Gini index (Foster and Wolfson, 2010). As a result, the polarization index
could move in the same or opposite direction as the Gini coefficient, so higher inequality could
be associated with either a smaller or larger middle class. In our exploration, we find that
the Gini and polarization indices in Peru move together during the 2004/2019 period. This
suggests that higher (lower) inequality is generally associated with a smaller (larger) middle
class, as in Gasparini et al. (2008).
4 Factors related to the decline in inequality in Peru
This section examines the primary factors associated with the reduction of Peru’s inequality
in the first two decades of this century. To this end, we utilize two well-known inequality
indices decomposition methods.10 Recent studies that utilize one or more of these methods
in the context of other countries include and Amarante (2016), Rani and Furrer (2016) and
Benjamin et al. (2017).
4.1 The factor decompositions
Let Y denote total income (consumption) at a given time, which is the aggregate of K income
(consumption) categories {y1, y2, . . . , yK}. Thus:
Y =
K∑
k=1
yk such that
K∑
k=1
Wk = 1 where Wk =
yk
Y
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K , (3)
where Wk is the share of income (consumption) from source k.
4.1.1 The Shorrocks method
This method decomposes overall inequality into the contributions of its different component.
More precisely, just as Y itself, an inequality indicator I(Y ) can be expressed the sum of k
contributions Ck, k = 1, 2, ...K, of I(Y ) = C1(Y ) + C2(Y ) + · · ·+ CK(Y ).
Let Sk be the share of income (consumption) inequality attributed to the k-th category:
Sk = Ck(Y )/I(Y ). Shorrocks (1982) shows that for any inequality measure I(Y ) that satisfy
a number of basic and desired axioms
Sk =
cov(yk, Y )
var(Y )
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K . (4)
10 The original survey data is used in this analysis because of the adding up issues introduced by winsorizing
the data.
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Interestingly, equation (4) shows that Sk does not depend on the particular type of the
inequality measure I(Y ), but on the correlation between the source and the total. Note also
that Sk can be computed from the output of the OLS estimation of the simple linear regression
of yk on Y .
Note that if Sk < Wk, then the k source of income (consumption) has a mitigating effect on
inequality. It contributes less to overall inequality than to the mean income (consumption).
On the contrary, if Sk > Wk, the k source of income (consumption) has an amplifying effect on
inequality. It contributes more to overall inequality than to the mean income (consumption).
4.1.2 The Lerman and Yitzhaki method
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) shows that Gini coefficient of Y can be expressed as a linear
combination of the Gini coefficients of the k sources. In particular:
G(Y ) =
K∑
k=1
WkRkGk ≡
K∑
k=1
WkCk , (5)
where Rk is the so-called “Gini correlation” between income (consumption) source k and total
income (consumption) Y . Gk is the Gini coefficient of income (consumption) source k. Finally
Ck = RkGk is the concentration index of income (consumption) source k.
The change in overall inequality over time can be determined by taking differences of (5)
(Amarante, 2016)
∆G(Y ) =
K∑
k=1
(Wk∆Ck +∆WkCk +∆Wk∆Ck) , (6)
this change in overall inequality is the result of both changes in the source k concentration
∆Ck and changes in the source k share ∆Wk.
It is worth mentioning that the change in the concentration index is given by ∆Ck =
∆RkGk + Rk∆Gk +∆Rk∆Gk. A simple inspection shows that the concentration index does
not change if and only if ∆Rk = ∆Gk = 0.
4.2 What income sources contributed to the reduction of inequality?
Household income comes from three primary sources: wages, public transfers, and other
income. In 2004, wages accounted for 66 percent of household income (Table 5, column 2).
Other income accounted for 26 percent of household income, and the remainder is accounted
for by public transfers. In 2019, the contribution of wages to household income rose to 67.7
percent, while the contribution of other income and public transfers fell to 25.4 percent and 7
percent, respectively.
According to the Shorrocks decomposition, wages and other income were the two primary
sources of overall inequality in 2004. The estimates of the contributions to overall inequality
from these two sources, Sk, add to 92.2 percent of overall income inequality (see Table 5,
column 3), and are close to the corresponding contributions to total income, Wk. However,
these estimates suggest that both wage income and public transfers have an equalizing effect
on income disparities as they contribute slightly less to overall inequality than they do to
average income. In contrast, the other income contributed positively to income disparities.
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When examining the evolution of the contribution to overall income inequality from wages
and other income over time, we find that wages initially have an amplifying effect on overall
disparities and then an equalizing one while the opposite is true for the other income. The
contribution of wages and other income to overall income inequality rises to 95.1 percent
in 2008 before falling to 94.7 and 93.4 percent in 2013 and 2019, respectively (see Table
5). These movements largely mirror the changing contribution of wages to overall income
inequality. This contribution first rises sharply in 2008, as wages become an exacerbating
source of overall inequality and then falls in 2013 and 2019, as wages turn once again into
an equalizing force. The opposite movements were observed with the contribution of other
income to overall inequality. Lastly, public transfers remained as an equalizing source.
According to the Lerman and Yitzhaki decomposition, the three sources of income are
equalizing as they all contribute to the reduction of overall disparities during 2004/2019.
Wages and public transfers account for almost 80 percent of the reduction in the income Gini
coefficient in this period (Table 5, column 8). These findings are generally consistent with those
reported in Lopez–Calva and Lustig (2010) for a sample of selected Latin American countries.
Wages exhibit a declining Gini coefficient, while their correlation with overall income has
been steady. Moreover, the share of wages on overall income rises somewhat over time. As
a result, wages are the most important equalizing force. However, this effect has not been
homogeneous over time, since wages are first an unequalizing source of income in 2004/2008
before they become an equalizing source in 2008/2013 and 2013/2019 (Figure 12, left panel).
Public transfers are the second most important equalizing source of income during the period
of analysis. Because these transfers are typically targeted toward the poor, it is not surprising
that the Gini coefficient of this source is the highest among all income sources. Why are public
sector transfers considered an equalizing force? The main reason is the reduction in their Gini
coefficient, which fell by 9 percent from 2004/2019. This indicates that the coverage of public
transfer programs has improved over time. Besides, the correlation coefficient between public
transfers and overall household income also fell by 0.22 in the same period. However, the
importance of public transfers as equalizing forces has been declining over time (Figure 12,
left panel).11 They were the most important equalizing source during the 2004/2008 sub-period
and the least equalizing ones in 2008/2013. From 2004/2008, the equalizing effect of public
transfers more than offset the unequalizing effect of wages.
How do the different income sources account for the evolution of inequality in the urban and
rural areas? Wages and public transfers were the primary sources of reductions in income
disparities in urban areas (Figure 12, right panel). These two sources accounted for almost 80
percent of the reduction in urban income inequality. The importance of each of these sources as
an equalizing source, however, has varied over time. Wages were first unequalizing sources from
2004/2008 and were equalizing ones from 2008/2013 and 2013/2019. The Gini coefficient of
wages fell over time, indicating that these played an equalizing role. Public transfers have been
an equalizing source over time, although their importance has decreased. The Gini coefficient
of this income source fluctuated over time: It fell in 2004/2008, rose in 2008/2013, and fell
again in 2013/2019.
11 Other studies such as Yamada et al. (2012), Herrera (2017) and Flachsbarth et al. (2018) have also found that
public transfers played an important equalizing role, although the degree of importance varies across studies.
Lustig et al. (2014) report that cash transfers and direct taxes reduce inequality in Peru in a lesser extent
than in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. In constrast, Inchauste et al. (2012) find that public transfers play
a minor role compared to non-farm income in reducing poverty, and to agricultural labor income in reducing
rural inequality.
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Finally, wages and public transfers played smaller roles but were still important in reducing
income inequality in the rural areas from 2004/2019. These two sources accounted for about
55 percent of the reduction in rural income inequality. This reflects the fact that wages
contributed to the increase in inequality from 2004/2008, before becoming an equalizing force
from 2008–13 and 2013–19 (Figure 12, middle panel). In this latter sub-period, wages were
the most important equalizing force behind reducing inequality in the rural area and overall.
Public transfers were mostly an equalizing source, particularly so in 2004/2008. In this sub-
period, other income was the most important equalizing source, mainly because of the sharp
drop in its share of total income.
4.3 What consumption sources contributed to the reduction of inequality?
Household consumption expenses are divided into four budget components: food prepared at
home, social services, apparel/personal care, and other expenses.12 In 2004, food accounted for
almost 33 percent of all consumption expenses, services for 37 percent, apparel and personal
care for 22 percent, and others for the remainder. The contribution of these budget components
to total expenses has varied significantly over time. In 2019, the share of food prepared at home
of total expenses fell significantly to 26.4 percent while the other three budget components’
shares rose, particularly for services.
The Shorrocks decomposition suggests that food prepared at home and apparel/personal care
are the two budget components that have an equalizing effect, while services and other
expenses have an unequilizing one. In 2004, the contributions to consumption inequality
from food and apparel/personal care were smaller than their corresponding contributions
to total consumption Wk (Table 6, columns 2 and 3). The opposite is true for the other two
budget components, services, and other expenditures, as they have a disproportionate effect
on consumption inequality. Even though the contribution to overall consumption inequality
has changed over time, so have their corresponding contributions to total consumption.
These changes have not flipped the sign of the gaps between sk and Wk, which for food
and apparel/personal care has remained negative, while for services and other expenses, it
has remained positive. Thus, food and apparel/personal care remained equalizing budget
components up to 2019, while services and other expenses remained unequalizing ones.
On the other hand, the Lerman and Yitzhaki decomposition of the consumption Gini unveils
that the four budget components have helped reduce overall consumption inequality in
2004/2019, with food prepared at home and services budget components were the ones that
contributed the most to consumption inequality reduction. They accounted for almost 90
percent of the reduction in consumption inequality during this period (Table 6, column 8).
Food consumption budget was the key equalizing force because of its Gini coefficient, its
correlation —with overall consumption, and its share of total spending all fell. Services also
contributed to reducing inequality as their Gini and correlation coefficient fell, but their share
of total expenses rose. It is worth noting that the low food’s Gini coefficients indicate that
food, a necessity, is relatively homogeneously distributed among households. In contrast, the
services and other spending budget categories are more unequally distributed.
12 The first budget component, food prepared at home, is a proxy of basic consumption needs. It is also utilized
in estimating extreme poverty in other studies. The second budget component, services, are goods related to
basic services such as: education, health, transport, utilities and housing. The third budget component, apparel
and personal care, includes clothing and personal care expenses. The last component, other expenses, includes
expenses in restaurants, cultural and sports entertainment, communication (telephone, TV and internet), and
durable goods (furniture, equipment, cell phone, vehicle).
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The relative importance of the different budget categories as consumption equalizing forces
has varied over time. While food prepared at home has always been an equalizing component,
the other three budget components have been equalizing in some sub-periods and unequalizing
in others (Table 6). It is worth noting that the Gini coefficient of a budget component may
rise while its contribution to overall inequality falls. This is precisely the case for food during
2004/2018. In this sub-period, the increase in the Gini coefficient of food was more than
offset by a drop in the correlation between food and overall spending and its diminishing
share of total expenditures. Services were strongly equalizing between 2004 and 2008 and
unequalizing subsequently. The opposite was observed with apparel and personal care; this
budget component was unequalizing in 2004/2008 and equalizing thereafter (Figure 13, left
panel).
The food prepared at home component was strongly equalizing in urban and rural areas,
particularly in the latter areas (Figure 13, middle and right panels). Food accounted for 56
percent of the overall inequality reduction in the urban areas and 133 percent in the rural
areas.13 Instrumental in this substantial egalitarian contribution in the rural areas are a more
egalitarian food consumption reflected by a sharp drop in this component’s Gini coefficient; a
reduction in the correlation between food budget and overall consumption; and a reduction in
food’s share of total consumption spending. This means that the poor’s additional consumption
growth compared with that of the rich has mainly been allocated on food, probably related to
the massive reduction in extreme poverty.14 Most of these gains were achieved between 2004
and 2013, a period that coincides with Peru’s increased connection with the rest of the world
as a result of its free trade agreements.
The services component was equalizing in the urban areas and unequalizing in the rural ones.
Services account for almost 42 percent of the reduction in consumption inequality in the urban
areas and 45 percent of the increase in consumption inequality in the rural areas (Figure 13).
Why are there differences concerning this budget item? A brief inspection of the reduction in
overall inequality in the urban areas concerning services over time reveals that this component
helped reduce inequality sharply from 2004 to 2008. It then increased inequality in the following
two sub-periods. This is explained mainly by a sharp reduction in the concentration effect,
mainly driven by a reduction in the Gini coefficient for services in 2004/2008, which indicates
that this budget component became more available to different urban households.
Finally, the apparel and personal care budget was first an unequalizing component and then
an equalizing one, both in urban and rural areas. This component experienced a significant
increase in its share of the total budget in 2004–08, which more than offsets the declining
concentration effect and vice–versa. However, the effects of food and services changes are
much larger than those of apparel and personal care.
In summary, we find evidence that the decline of income inequality in Peru is associated with
both a narrowing in wage differentials and an increase in public transfers, the importance
of which varies by geographic area. Besides, the decline in consumption inequality is mainly
associated with narrowing the inequality in food spending and spending on services, the former
in rural areas, the latter in urban ones.
13 The fact that this contribution exceeds 100 percent implies that some of the other budget components had
an unequalizing contribution which partially offset the gains from food.
14 At the national level, the poverty rate declined from 58.7% in 2004 to 20.52% in 2019, and the rural extreme
poverty level declined from 41.6% to 9.8% during the same period.
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5 Conclusion
Inequality is a pervasive characteristic of the Peruvian economy. Income inequality and
consumption inequality were high in 2004, with substantial geographic and regional differences.
This high level of disparity was associated with a high degree of polarization in the Peruvian
economy. Both inequality and polarization were about average for the Latin American region
in 2004. Inequality experienced a significant decrease from 2004 to 2019, associated with the
strong growth observed in the Peruvian economy, suggesting that growth has been inclusive.
This decline in inequality is broad-based, yet it is not homogeneous across geographic zone,
regions, or time. Moreover, the drop in inequality is robust as it is detected by the various
inequality indicators that we utilized.
There are several factors associated with the decline in inequality, and their importance has
varied over time. Wages and public transfers are the two key factors associated with reducing
income inequality, particularly in urban areas. Both food prepared at home and services are
the two budget components associated with reducing consumption inequality, the former being
a key contributing component in rural areas. In contrast, services were an equalizing source
in the urban areas and an unequalizing source in the rural ones.
Despite experiencing one of the largest reductions of inequality in the Latin America region
during 2004/2019, Peru is still among the world’s most unequal countries. Moreover, the
Covid–19 pandemic is jeopardizing the gains in inequality reduction experienced, and it
is expected that inequality indices to deteriorate in 2020. However, would this increase in
inequality be a bump in the road or a turning point? The answer to this question depends
on several factors, and especially the duration of the pandemic. Peru is one of the Latin
American countries most severely affected by this pandemic. This reflects the weakness of
its health system, the importance of a large service sector, and the extent of informality.
Public policies, including transfers and expenses in services, will help mitigate the effects of
the pandemic and obtain a more equitable outcome.
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M. E., and Rodŕıguez-Castelán, C., editors, Shared Prosperity and Poverty Eradication in
Latin America and the Caribbean, chapter 1, pages 1–44. The World Bank.
Cowell, F. and Litchfield, J. (1999). Income inequality comparison with dirty data: the UK
and Spain during the 1980. Research Paper DARP 45, LSE STICERD.
Cruz Saco, M. A., Seminario, B., and Campos, C. (2018). Desigualdad (re)considerada Peru
1997–2015. Journal of Economics, Finance and International Business, 2(1):13–52.
Deaton, A. (2005). Measuring poverty in a growing world (or measuring growth in a poor
world). Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(1):1–19.
Dimelis, S. and Livada, A. (1999). Inequality and business cycles in the US and European
Union countries. International Advances in Economic Research, 5:321–338.
Easterly, W. (2001). The middle class consensus and economic development. Journal of
Economic Growth, 6(4):317–336.
Esteban, J. and Ray, D. (2011). Linking conflict to inequality and polarization. American
Economic Review, 101(4):1345–1374.
Ferreira, F. H. G., Messina, J., Rigolini, J., López-Calva, L. F., Lugo, M. A., and Vakis, R.
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Krueger, D. and Perri, F. (2006). Does income inequality lead to consumption inequality?
evidence and theory. Review of Economic Studies, 73(1):163–193.
Lerman, R. I. and Yitzhaki, S. (1985). Income inequality effects by income source: A new
approach and applications in the united states. Reviews of Economics and Statistics,
67(1):151–156.
Loayza, N. and Rigolini, J. (2016). The local impact of mining on poverty and inequality:
Evidence from the commodity boom in Peru. World Development, 84(C):219–234.
Lopez–Calva, L. and Lustig, N. (2010). Explaining the decline in inequality in Latin America:
Technological change, educational upgrading, and democracy. In Declining Inequality in
Latin America: A Decade of Progress?, chapter 1, pages 1–24. Brookings Institution Press.
Lustig, N., Pessino, C., and Scott, J. (2014). The impact of taxes and social spending on
inequality and poverty in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. Public
Finance Review, 42(3):287–303.
19
Mendoza, W., Leyva, J., and Flor, J. L. (2011). La distribución del ingreso en el Perú: 1980-
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Tables and figures
Table 1. Changes in inequality by areas
2004/2019 2004/2008 2008/2013 2013/2019
(A) All Gini Income −6.685∗∗∗ −1.272∗ −3.302∗∗∗ −2.111∗∗∗
index (0.625) (0.691) (0.432) (0.425)
Consumption −4.652∗∗∗ −1.713∗∗∗ −2.484∗∗∗ −0.454
(0.615) (0.648) (0.355) (0.378)
Theil Income −11.298∗∗∗ −2.728∗∗ −5.384∗∗∗ −3.186∗∗∗
index (1.082) (1.221) (0.713) (0.620)
Consumption −6.289∗∗∗ −3.019∗∗∗ −2.841∗∗∗ −0.428
(0.844) (0.889) (0.426) (0.431)
Bottom/top Income 6.328∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 3.423∗∗∗ 2.545∗∗∗
20% (0.041) (0.041) (0.032) (0.038)
Expenditure 4.735∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ 4.221∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.036) (0.040)
(B) Urban Gini Income −5.478∗∗∗ −1.311 −2.772∗∗∗ −1.396∗∗∗
index (0.732) (0.813) (0.500) (0.451)
Consumption −3.073∗∗∗ −2.316∗∗∗ −1.025∗∗∗ 0.267
(0.700) (0.729) (0.388) (0.404)
Theil Income −8.805∗∗∗ −2.448∗ −4.343∗∗∗ −2.014∗∗∗
index (1.131) (1.277) (0.735) (0.585)
Consumption −4.188∗∗∗ −3.388∗∗∗ −1.042∗∗ 0.242
(0.861) (0.895) (0.422) (0.428)
Bottom/top Income 3.832∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 2.186∗∗∗ 1.282∗∗∗
20% (0.047) (0.046) (0.040) (0.044)
Consumption 1.276∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 1.492∗∗∗ −0.761∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.041) (0.045)
(C) Rural Gini Income −2.832∗∗∗ 1.634∗∗ −1.715∗∗∗ −2.751∗∗∗
index (0.604) (0.672) (0.510) (0.471)
Consumption −3.131∗∗∗ 0.370 −1.326∗∗∗ −2.174∗∗∗
(0.470) (0.541) (0.454) (0.409)
Theil Income −4.841∗∗∗ 1.700∗ −3.050∗∗∗ −3.491∗∗∗
index (0.872) (1.012) (0.759) (0.640)
Consumption −3.180∗∗∗ 0.157 −1.271∗∗∗ −2.067∗∗∗
(0.468) (0.554) (0.459) (0.395)
Bottom/top Income 1.409∗∗∗ −2.511∗∗∗ 0.020 3.900∗∗∗
20% (0.054) (0.060) (0.047) (0.042)
Consumption 4.337∗∗∗ −1.984∗∗∗ 2.680∗∗∗ 3.641∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.066) (0.055) (0.047)
Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
Notes: The change in the inequality indices are multiplied by 100. Standard errors, as computed by the
Distributive Analysis Stata Package (Abdelkrim and Duclos, 2007), are reported in parentheses. * [**] {***}
indicates statistical significance at the 10% [5%] {1%} confidence level.
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Table 2. Changes in inequality by geographical region
2004/2019 2004/2008 2008/2013 2013/2019
(A) North Gini Income −6.914∗∗∗ −0.179 −1.895∗∗ −4.840∗∗∗
index (0.894) (1.064) (0.766) (0.730)
Consumption −3.640∗∗∗ 0.153 −2.233∗∗∗ −1.560∗∗
(0.823) (0.960) (0.684) (0.690)
Bottom/top Income 7.646∗∗∗ −0.543∗∗∗ 2.658∗∗∗ 5.530∗∗∗
20% (0.075) (0.085) (0.069) (0.072)
Consumption 6.300∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 3.233∗∗∗ 2.760∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.090) (0.074) (0.076)
(B) Center Gini Income −6.691∗∗∗ −2.345∗∗ −3.396∗∗∗ −0.950
index (0.996) (1.112) (0.688) (0.658)
Consumption −4.454∗∗∗ −3.079∗∗∗ −1.696∗∗∗ 0.320
(0.996) (1.041) (0.542) (0.589)
Bottom/top Income 6.367∗∗∗ 2.144∗∗∗ 2.955∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗∗
20% (0.064) (0.065) (0.054) (0.059)
Consumption 3.049∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 2.853∗∗∗ −0.807∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.072) (0.054) (0.060)
(C) South Gini Income −5.429∗∗∗ 1.920∗ −5.382∗∗∗ −1.966∗∗∗
index (0.861) (0.999) (0.830) (0.761)
Consumption −5.476∗∗∗ 0.055 −4.782∗∗∗ −0.748
(0.784) (0.918) (0.748) (0.646)
Bottom/top Income 3.641∗∗∗ −2.658∗∗∗ 4.293∗∗∗ 2.006∗∗∗
20% (0.069) (0.066) (0.064) (0.071)
Consumption 6.113∗∗∗ −0.993∗∗∗ 6.311∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.080) (0.071) (0.071)
(D) Amazon Gini Income −1.841∗∗ 2.561∗∗∗ −1.661∗∗ −2.741∗∗∗
index (0.870) (0.984) (0.801) (0.756)
Consumption −2.278∗∗∗ 1.556∗ −2.264∗∗∗ −1.570∗∗
(0.750) (0.864) (0.677) (0.616)
Bottom/top Income −0.466∗∗∗ −3.479∗∗∗ 0.007 3.006∗∗∗
20% (0.085) (0.086) (0.062) (0.067)
Consumption 1.793∗∗∗ −2.179∗∗∗ 1.677∗∗∗ 2.295∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.091) (0.070) (0.071)
Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
Notes: The change in the inequality indices are multiplied by 100. Standard errors, as computed by the
Distributive Analysis Stata Package (Abdelkrim and Duclos, 2007), are reported in parentheses. * [**] {***}
indicates statistical significance at the 10% [5%] {1%} confidence level.
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Table 3. Inequality and economic growth
Gini index Theil index
Income Consumption Income Consumption
β0 −0.018
∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.013 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.015∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
β1 −0.006 0.004 −0.013
∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.014 0.001 −0.016∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005)
β2 −0.015 −0.009 −0.030
∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.011 −0.030∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
β3 −0.026
∗∗ −0.017 −0.009 0.006 −0.043∗∗ −0.030 −0.012 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.021) (0.021) (0.009) (0.007)
ρ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.066) (0.068) (0.070)
LRM −0.064∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.033) (0.034) (0.024) (0.022)
ML 1.750∗∗∗ 2.730∗∗∗ 1.524∗∗∗ 2.097∗∗∗ 1.772∗∗∗ 2.504∗∗∗ 1.538∗∗∗ 2.042∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.732) (0.215) (0.408) (0.275) (0.629) (0.231) (0.377)
Observations 384 360 384 360 384 360 384 360
Regions 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Time periods 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15
Adjusted R2 0.487 0.646 0.497 0.674 0.478 0.603 0.489 0.647
Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019, and Ministry of Economy and Finance. Own elaboration.
Notes: Fixed-effects estimation of equation (1) for k = 3 for various inequality indices. LRM and ML are
defined in equation (2) and their standard errors are computed with the delta method. All regressions include
political region and time effects. Standard errors clusterized by region in parentheses. * [**] {***} indicates
statistical significance at the 10% [5%] {1%} confidence level.
Table 4. Changes in polarization
Indices Changes
2004 2009 2004/2019 2004/2008 2008/2013 2013/2019
Income 43.28 35.17 −8.111∗∗∗ −1.471 −4.122∗∗∗ −2.518∗∗∗
(0.976) (1.106) (0.736) (0.662)
Consumption 33.36 29.51 −3.852∗∗∗ −0.224 −3.369∗∗∗ −0.260
(0.744) (0.822) (0.550) (0.526)
Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
Notes: The Polarization indices and their corresponding changes are multiplied by 100. Standard errors,
as computed by the Distributive Analysis Stata Package (Abdelkrim and Duclos, 2007), are reported in
parentheses. * [**] {***} indicates statistical significance at the 10% [5%] {1%} confidence level.
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Table 5. Income inequality by source
Shorrocks Lerman and Yitzhaki
Wk Sk Gk Rk Ck WkCk Change Change
t/(t− 1) t/2004
2004
Wages 66.0 65.6 52.71 0.90 47.51 31.37 − −
Public transfers 7.9 7.7 86.11 0.68 58.89 4.68 − −
Other 26.0 26.7 60.97 0.82 50.14 13.05 − −
Total 100.0 100.0 49.09 1.00 49.09 49.09 − −
2008
Wages 68.1 72.7 51.35 0.91 46.67 31.80 0.43 0.43
Public transfers 7.5 4.9 78.93 0.57 44.93 3.35 −1.33 −1.33
Other 24.4 22.4 62.55 0.82 51.01 12.45 −0.60 −0.60
Total 100.0 100.0 47.60 1.00 47.60 47.60 −1.49 −1.49
2013
Wages 69.3 67.1 47.40 0.91 42.99 29.79 −2.01 −1.58
Public transfers 6.9 5.3 79.70 0.51 40.50 2.78 −0.57 −1.90
Other 23.9 27.6 59.87 0.80 48.15 11.49 −0.96 −1.56
Total 100.0 100.0 44.05 1.00 44.05 44.05 −3.55 −5.04
2019
Wages 67.7 64.7 45.79 0.89 40.72 27.55 −2.24 −3.82
Public transfers 7.0 6.6 77.02 0.47 36.09 2.51 −0.27 −2.17
Other 25.4 28.8 57.50 0.79 45.29 11.49 0.00 −1.56
Total 100.0 100.0 41.55 1.00 41.55 41.55 −2.50 −7.54
Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
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Table 6. Consumption inequality by source
Shorrocks Lerman and Yitzhaki
Wk Sk Gk Rk Ck WkCk Change Change
t/(t− 1) t/2004
2004
Food 32.7 12.1 29.88 0.71 21.16 6.91 − −
Services 37.5 57.4 55.21 0.94 51.84 19.42 − −
Apparel/personal care 22.3 17.3 50.47 0.78 39.12 8.71 − −
Others 7.6 13.1 63.96 0.91 58.16 4.42 − −
Total 100.0 100.0 39.46 1.00 39.46 39.46 − −
2008
Food 30.3 13.4 30.74 0.71 21.79 6.59 −0.32 −0.32
Services 35.8 49.3 51.01 0.93 47.60 17.02 −2.40 −2.40
Apparel/personal care 25.4 23.5 47.32 0.78 36.98 9.37 0.66 0.66
Others 8.6 13.8 58.32 0.90 52.47 4.53 0.11 0.11
Total 100.0 100.0 37.52 1.00 37.52 37.52 −1.94 −1.94
2013
Food 27.6 10.1 27.78 0.63 17.43 4.81 −1.78 −2.10
Services 37.9 53.3 48.93 0.93 45.35 17.20 0.18 −2.22
Apparel/personal care 25.5 23.6 45.15 0.78 35.14 8.95 −0.42 0.24
Others 9.0 12.9 52.58 0.87 45.62 4.10 −0.43 −0.32
Total 100.0 100.0 35.07 1.00 35.07 35.07 −2.45 −4.39
2019
Food 26.4 9.4 26.55 0.58 15.50 4.09 −0.72 −2.82
Services 40.3 54.4 47.21 0.93 43.87 17.69 0.49 −1.73
Apparel/personal care 23.8 22.4 44.58 0.78 34.92 8.30 −0.65 −0.41
Others 9.5 13.8 51.61 0.88 45.18 4.29 0.19 −0.13
Total 100.0 100.0 34.38 1.00 34.38 34.38 −0.69 −5.08
Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
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Figure 1. Macroeconomic context: Real GDP, terms of trade, and public transfers
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Sources: Central Bank of Peru and Ministry of Economy and Finance. Own elaboration.
Notes: Public transfers include the execution in seven programs—conditional cash transfers (Juntos),
non–contributory pensions (Pension 65), housing subsidy (Techo Propio), scholarships (PRONABEC), school
feeding (Qali Warma), daycare (Cuna Mas), and communal infrastructure (FONCODES). All variables are in
real terms.
Figure 2. Inequality
(a) Gini index (b) Theil index (c) Bottom-to-top 20% ratio
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
Notes: Bounds are 95% confidence intervals. Winzorized data.
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Figure 3. Income and consumption Lorenz curves
(a.1) Relative curves for income (a.2) Relative curves for consumption
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
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Figure 4. Income and consumption growth by percentiles
(a) Income (b) Consumption
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
Figure 5. Inequality by geographic area
(a) Gini indices (b) Theil indices
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
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Figure 6. Income and consumption growth by percentiles and geographic area
(a.1) Income, urban (a.2) Income, rural
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(b.1) Consumption, urban (b.2) Consumption, rural
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
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Figure 7. Income and consumption inequality by geographical region
(a.1) Gini indices (a.2) Gini indices
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
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Figure 8. Income and consumption inequality across political regions
(a.1) Gini index for income (a.2) Gini index for consumption
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
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Figure 9. Income and consumption growth by percentiles and geographical region
(a) Income
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
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Figure 10. Polarization indices
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
Figure 11. Income and consumption distribution functions
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
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Figure 12. Decomposition of the changes in income inequality
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
Notes: Changes in the Gini index times 100 decomposed by the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) method using
non-winzorized data.
Figure 13. Decomposition of the changes in consumption inequality
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
Notes: Changes in the Gini index times 100 decomposed by the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) method using
non-winzorized data.
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Appendix
Inequality indicators with raw and treated data
(a.1) Gini index for income (a.2) Gini index for consumption
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Sources: ENAHO, rounds from 2004 to 2019. Own elaboration.
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